5) Why this is happening now
Several converging forces explain timing:
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Regional realignment after Middle East shocks and Red Sea insecurity,
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Demand for cost-effective airpower for internal security and deterrence—not peer-to-peer air wars,
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Pakistan’s rising export comfort post-operational exposure and iterative upgrades,
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Western export caution under sanctions and reputational risk.
This is not about outperforming Rafale or Su-30 in a symmetric war. It’s about availability, affordability, training depth, and political clearance.
6) Addressing the “Pakistani PR” accusation head-on
If this were propaganda:
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it wouldn’t originate in Reuters,
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it wouldn’t cite multiple independent sources,
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and it wouldn’t align with existing export pipelines (Myanmar, Nigeria, Azerbaijan; negotiations elsewhere).
The fiercest criticism paradoxically concedes the core reality: Pakistan can execute such exports, even if margins are modest. On a JF-17, net profit may be a few hundred thousand dollars per unit—still meaningful for Pakistan’s defence industry and balance-of-payments math.
7) Why the West isn’t blocking it
Another misconception is that Washington would automatically veto any Chinese-linked platform sale.
In practice:
