“I Don’t Trust Pakistan as Far as I Can Throw Them”
On May 12, 2026, Graham questioned Pakistan’s role in US-Iran negotiations during a Senate Appropriations subcommittee hearing.
His words were direct:
“I don’t trust Pakistan as far as I can throw them.”
Graham was reacting to a CBS report, based on anonymous US officials, alleging that Iranian military aircraft had been parked at Pakistani airfields and were potentially being protected from American strikes. American military officials questioned during the hearing declined to publicly verify the intelligence, citing classified matters and ongoing negotiations. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry categorically rejected the interpretation, saying Iranian and American aircraft had arrived in connection with the Islamabad talks and that the Iranian aircraft had no military preservation arrangement.
Here is the part that should irritate Pakistan.
The senator once rewarded by Pakistan for “Services to Pakistan” did not merely ask for clarification.
He publicly attacked the credibility of Pakistan as a mediator.
He said perhaps somebody else should mediate.
He declared his distrust before the military officials sitting in front of him publicly confirmed the allegation.
Meanwhile, President Trump told reporters that Pakistan had been “great” and specifically praised Pakistan’s field marshal and prime minister.
Graham was, at that moment, harder on Pakistan than the American president whose administration was actually involved in the negotiations.
And this is why Nuclear Pakistan Did Not Need Washington’s Permission to Act Like a Sovereign State remains relevant beyond one particular crisis. A nuclear state of Pakistan’s size cannot indefinitely shape its diplomatic decisions around the fear that a foreign senator may stop calling us a strategic partner.
The Abraham Accords Exposed the Deeper Disagreement
Graham’s suspicion of Pakistan did not exist in a geopolitical vacuum.
As the Trump administration sought to connect wider Iran diplomacy with expansion of the Abraham Accords, Pakistan rejected the proposition of folding its Israel policy into that framework. Reuters reported in May 2026 that Trump was encouraging countries including Pakistan to join the Accords as part of a broader regional diplomatic strategy; Pakistan rejected that proposal.
Graham publicly highlighted Pakistan’s longstanding hostility towards Israel and questioned Islamabad’s suitability as an Iran mediator. His own X account argued that Pakistan’s animosity towards Israel was longstanding while raising the aircraft allegation.
There it was.
The relationship had moved from Afghanistan to Iran.
Pakistan’s usefulness had changed.
The ideological pressure point had changed.
And suddenly the man once officially listed by Pakistan under “Services to Pakistan” did not trust Pakistan.
This is not proof that Graham secretly served some hidden “master”. Serious political analysis does not require that claim. His public record is sufficient. He was an exceptionally committed supporter of Israel, an aggressive voice against Iran and a foreign-policy hawk who viewed alliances primarily through the security priorities he believed America should defend. Mainstream reporting on his death itself identifies Israel, Iran and interventionist foreign policy as defining components of his career.
Pakistan simply became inconvenient to those priorities.
That is a much stronger argument than a conspiracy theory because it is documented.
Was This Imran Khan’s Award to Lindsey Graham?
This question is already circulating, particularly because the award was announced during the PTI government’s tenure and Graham had been directly involved in the Trump-Imran Khan engagement of 2019.
The political responsibility certainly belongs to the Pakistani state decision taken during that period. The public documentary record shows Graham participating in the Trump-Khan engagement, openly praising a strategic relationship with Pakistan in July and appearing on Pakistan’s civil-awards list in August.
However, the official civil-awards announcement available publicly does not establish that Imran Khan personally wrote, initiated or individually approved Graham’s nomination. Saying “Pakistan under the PTI-era government honoured Graham” is documentary fact. Claiming we possess proof that Khan personally selected the name requires nomination records that I have not seen in the public material reviewed for this article.
That distinction matters.
Because our case does not become stronger by inventing a document we do not possess.
It becomes stronger by reading the documents we do possess.
