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Formally banned LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed in 2002
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Withdrew institutional and political support for any non-state armed activity in Indian-administered Jammu & Kashmir (IIOJK)
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Publicly articulated that Kashmir must be resolved diplomatically, not militarily
This pivot marked the end of the so-called “indigenous militia” doctrine—years before FATF pressure or post-9/11 compliance narratives.
3. Nawaz Sharif’s Civilian De-Escalation Doctrine
Civilian leadership reinforced that shift.
During his tenure, Nawaz Sharif:
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Refused to meet Hurriyat Conference leaders, a symbolic but politically costly decision domestically
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Prioritized trade normalization and dialogue with India
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Advanced a policy line that Pakistan would not internationalize Kashmir through proxies
These were not crowd-pleasing moves inside Pakistan. They were deliberate signals of restraint.
4. Pulwama, Pahalgam, and the Evidence Gap
High-casualty attacks demand high-grade proof. Yet in cases like Pulwama (2019) and Pahalgam (2025):
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No forensically verifiable, court-tested evidence has been produced linking the Pakistani state to operational planning
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Pakistan formally offered joint, independent investigations, including third-party or international participation
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Those offers were declined, while allegations continued to circulate in media ecosystems
In international law and counter-terror jurisprudence, refusal of joint inquiry weakens—not strengthens—accusatory credibility.
