No, Ship Displacement Alone Does Not Reveal the Winner
A favourite online argument compares a roughly 2,600-ton PNS Hunain with a roughly 7,400-ton Kolkata-class destroyer and then declares that the smaller vessel must have suffered the greater damage. That sounds intuitive but is technically inadequate.
Collision damage depends on relative velocity, contact angle, the precise points of impact, compartmentation, structural reinforcement and whether the contact involved a bow, stern, flare, sponson or comparatively vulnerable side plating. A smaller vessel’s reinforced bow can damage the side of a larger ship, while the smaller vessel may simultaneously suffer serious deformation elsewhere. Displacement alone cannot reconstruct the event.
PNS Hunain is a second-batch Yarmook-class offshore patrol vessel based on Damen’s OPV 2600 design. Available specifications place the platform at about 98 metres in length, with aviation and modular mission capacity. The Defence Post’s account of the class confirms the OPV 2600 basis and approximately 98-metre hull. It is a substantial naval platform, but calling it equivalent to a heavily armed Kolkata-class guided-missile destroyer confuses entirely different roles and combat architectures.
At the same time, the Indian destroyer’s greater displacement does not make it immune to collision damage. Steel does not salute national flags before deforming.
The Viral “Damage Evidence” Is a Minefield
Several supposed photographs of a damaged Pakistani vessel circulated within hours. Some showed the wrong class of ship; others were labelled alternately as PNS Hunain, PNS Taimur or a Tughril-class frigate. One comparison highlighted inconsistent hull numbers and structural features. Another image displayed weathering and corrosion patterns implausibly advanced for damage allegedly sustained only hours earlier. Such anomalies do not by themselves prove artificial intelligence was used, but they are enough to disqualify the image as reliable evidence until its original file, capture time and location are authenticated.
A photograph of an actual damaged vessel is not automatically a photograph from this incident. A real image can be miscaptioned just as easily as an artificial image can be generated.
Claims that INS Kolkata was “limping,” flooded below deck, being towed to Hazira or facing two to three months of repairs remain similarly unsupported by independently verified evidence. Pakistani accounts should not repeat those claims as facts merely because Indian accounts rushed to publish equally unsupported stories about PNS Hunain sustaining a “huge dent” and fleeing to harbour.
Pakistan’s case becomes more credible when it refuses to manufacture certainty.
The Old PNS Babur–INS Godavari Video Is Not New Evidence
The most blatant contamination involved video from the June 2011 confrontation between PNS Babur and INS Godavari during the evacuation connected to the merchant vessel MV Suez, whose crew had been released by Somali pirates.
That footage is historical. It does not show PNS Hunain in September 2026.
The 2011 episode is relevant as precedent because it demonstrates that dangerous close manoeuvring between the two navies is not unprecedented. Pakistan maintained that PNS Babur was supporting a humanitarian operation and accused INS Godavari of dangerous interference; India blamed the Pakistani vessel. An Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses case study of the MV Suez operation described a near collision that endangered personnel, while Dawn’s contemporary reporting documented PNS Babur’s completion of the rescue operation.
But historical relevance does not convert an old clip into footage of a new collision. Reposting it without a date misleads audiences and weakens Pakistan’s information position.
Was This a Maritime Galwan?
Only in the loosest metaphorical sense. Galwan involved an intentionally weapon-restricted land confrontation that escalated into lethal hand-to-hand fighting. This Arabian Sea encounter involved major armed vessels governed by navigation rules, bilateral separation commitments and military rules of engagement. No credible evidence currently shows weapons were fired or that either navy intended to begin a naval battle.
Calling the collision a “victory” is therefore premature. Calling India’s version an established fact is equally premature.
The strategically important question is why two nuclear-armed rivals, both possessing modern surveillance equipment and professional bridge teams, came close enough for steel to touch despite a treaty demanding 5.56 kilometres of separation. Either one vessel deliberately closed the other, both captains misread an evolving encounter, communications failed, or a calculated signalling manoeuvre crossed the line into physical contact. Every possibility is serious.
What Nobody Is Telling You
The loudest accounts are debating which ship “mogged” the other because memes require a winner. Professional analysis asks what evidence each government is withholding.
If both ships carried functioning radar, electronic navigation systems and bridge recording procedures, then both governments probably possess far clearer evidence than the public has seen. Selective disclosure allows each side’s media ecosystem to fill the vacuum with recycled videos, unverifiable “local sources,” computer-generated damage and fantasies about missiles that were never fired.
India’s immediate emphasis on restraint also reveals the political bind created by its own rhetoric. Indian nationalist accounts simultaneously claim that INS Kolkata was never threatened and complain that it should have destroyed the Pakistani vessel. Those positions cannot comfortably coexist: firing missiles after a non-lethal collision in international waters would not be “professionalism”; it could trigger a regional war.
Pakistan should not copy that recklessness. The stronger response is to publish a disciplined timeline, the exercise notification, navigational track, relevant bridge communications and authenticated post-incident imagery while protecting genuinely sensitive capabilities. Evidence would do more damage to propaganda than a thousand anonymous victory graphics.
Readers examining this wider contest should continue with the analysis of Indian false propaganda against Pakistan, the examination of India’s BrahMos narrative and missile credibility, and the broader historical context of the 1965 Pakistan–India war. Pakistan’s maritime position also makes more sense when read alongside the country’s emerging offshore drilling and Arabian Sea strategy and its previous maritime win analysis.
What Happens Next?
The immediate diplomatic theatre has already occurred: both capitals have summoned diplomats and accused the other side of violating safety obligations. The responsible next steps would be a bilateral exchange of navigational data, preservation of bridge and communications records, technical examination of both ships, and activation of military-to-military mechanisms designed to stop a dangerous encounter from becoming an armed one.
Pakistan must defend its lawful naval exercises and reject one-sided Indian attribution, but it should do so through evidence, not borrowed footage or premature boasts. A professional navy does not need a fabricated dent on an enemy ship to establish resolve. It needs command discipline, maritime awareness and the confidence to release enough verified information to prevent hostile media from writing the entire incident on its behalf.
The collision is real. The claimed “victories” remain unproven. The propaganda flotilla, however, is already operating at full speed—and unless primary evidence emerges, it may prove more dangerous to public understanding than the brief contact between the ships themselves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Did PNS Hunain deliberately ram INS Kolkata?
That has not been established. India attributes the collision to unsafe Pakistani manoeuvring, while Pakistan accuses the Indian vessel of closing aggressively during a Pakistani exercise. No independent radar reconstruction has been released.
