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In Lagaan, the cruelty is not simply that the British make Indians play cricket. It is that somebody else owns the ground, writes the rules, chooses the contest and decides what the people must risk merely to earn relief from a burden imposed upon them.
Now place Pakistan in that frame.
Not literally. Britain does not govern Pakistan, England does not appoint the PCB chairman, and Pakistan’s defeats cannot seriously be explained as some continuation of the Raj. But as a metaphor for power, dependency and institutional ownership, Lagaan becomes uncomfortable viewing when placed beside Pakistan cricket in 2026. The colonial officers have disappeared, the Pakistani flag flies over the board, Pakistani administrators occupy the offices and Pakistani selectors choose the XI. Yet supporters can reasonably ask a distinctly Lagaan-like question: who actually owns the game?
That question feels especially brutal today because Pakistan has just lost the first two Tests of its 2026 tour of England, surrendering the series before the third Test has even begun. England won the second Test at Lord’s by 194 runs after dismissing Pakistan for only 110 in the first innings. Reuters reports that Pakistan has now won only one of its last eight Test series. The response was extraordinary even by Pakistan cricket’s standards: seven players were sent home, the coaching structure was changed again, and former Pakistan coach Jason Gillespie publicly attacked the instability surrounding the team. Pakistan has had six Test coaches in three years.
That is no longer a bad innings.
That is an institution telling on itself.
The graph that started an argument Pakistan should actually have
The most interesting material circulating in recent weeks is not another angry television monologue about Babar Azam, another selector blaming temperament or another former cricketer demanding that three players be dropped.
It is a graph.
The chart shared in the discussion around Pakistan’s Test history plots a trailing ten-year moving average of match performance. Its shape is striking. Pakistan begins poorly in the 1960s, improves sharply from the late 1970s, reaches its historical high around the great teams spanning the Imran Khan era and the generation immediately following him, and then begins a long deterioration. By the mid-2020s, the curve has descended toward territory not seen for decades.
The accompanying opponent-adjusted chart matters because it attempts to answer an obvious objection: perhaps Pakistan merely played stronger opposition in some periods. Yet the broad rise and decline survives that adjustment in the supplied analysis.
That is evidence of a trend. It is not evidence that democracy caused victories or dictatorship caused defeats.
This distinction matters enormously.
A cricket graph cannot prove a political theory merely because somebody places the dates of military rulers above it. Correlation is not causation, and Pakistan’s history supplies immediate counterexamples to any simplistic claim. Imran Khan became captain in 1982 while General Zia-ul-Haq ruled Pakistan. Pakistan won the 2009 T20 World Cup shortly after the Musharraf period. The great Misbah-ul-Haq Test side flourished during civilian governments. Sarfaraz Ahmed’s Pakistan won the 2017 Champions Trophy during another civilian period. Pakistan cricket therefore refuses to fit conveniently inside either a pro-democracy or pro-dictatorship meme.
The interesting finding lies deeper.
Pakistan cricket appears strongest when cricketing authority, talent development and leadership acquire continuity, regardless of who happens to occupy Islamabad—and weakest when institutional churn overwhelms those things.
That is a much more defensible argument.
Pakistan’s political eras and cricket: what the record actually permits us to say
Pakistan experienced long periods of direct military rule under Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf. But placing those administrations beside cricket performance immediately shows why political regime alone cannot explain the curve.
| Political / cricket era | National political setting | Cricketing picture | What can responsibly be inferred |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1958–1969 | Ayub Khan military rule | Pakistan remained a developing Test nation; results were generally modest | Cricket institutions and player depth were still immature |
| 1969–1971 | Yahya Khan military rule | Weak period overlapping enormous national upheaval | Political instability coincided with sporting weakness, but does not establish causation |
| 1971–1977 | Civilian rule | Performance began improving as a formidable generation emerged | Talent, international exposure and leadership increasingly mattered |
| 1977–1988 | Zia-ul-Haq military rule | Pakistan rose dramatically; Imran Khan became captain in 1982 | A decisive counterexample to “dictatorship automatically destroys cricket” |
| 1988–1999 | Elected governments with repeated political disruption | Pakistan won the 1992 World Cup and remained an elite Test force through much of the decade | The Imran-Wasim-Waqar-Miandad generation outlived governments |
| 1999–2008 | Musharraf military rule | Pakistan remained dangerous but inconsistent | Again, no simple regime-performance relationship |
| 2008–2018 | Civilian governments | 2009 T20 champions, Misbah-era Test success, 2017 Champions Trophy | Pakistan could still create world-class peaks despite structural weaknesses |
| 2018–2022 | PTI civilian government | Domestic cricket radically restructured; mixed international outcomes | Political direction reached deeply into cricket architecture |
| 2022–2026 | Coalition/civilian governments amid wider institutional controversy | Severe Test volatility, repeated management changes and 2026 England crisis | Governance instability is now impossible to separate from performance analysis |
The most important row might actually be 1977–1988.
Why?
Because it prevents us from writing propaganda instead of history.
Imran Khan’s greatest development as Pakistan captain occurred under Zia’s dictatorship. Pakistan’s Test captaincy records show Imran captained 48 Tests, winning 14, losing only eight and drawing 26. Javed Miandad’s overlapping captaincy produced 14 wins against six defeats.
So dictatorship did not prevent the emergence of Pakistan’s greatest cricketing generation.
But neither does that vindicate dictatorship.
It suggests something more interesting: elite sporting systems can temporarily outperform dysfunctional political systems when strong leadership, extraordinary talent, institutional memory and competitive pathways become sufficiently powerful.
Imran’s Pakistan was not great because Pakistan was ruled by a general.
It was great because Pakistan had Imran Khan, Javed Miandad, Abdul Qadir and eventually the ecosystem that produced Wasim Akram and Waqar Younis—and because those cricketers acquired enormous competitive exposure and increasingly believed that Pakistan belonged at cricket’s top table.
That mentality is precisely what Pakistan seems to have misplaced.
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