Why Is Trump Celebrating an Alliance That Appears to Reduce American Control?
Trump’s message described the agreement as a “big, bold, and important first step,” while Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif publicly thanked him and credited his leadership with helping avert a nuclear catastrophe in South Asia. The Pakistani response may be read as deliberate diplomacy: praise an ego-driven American president, reduce immediate hostility and obtain room for Pakistan to build alternative partnerships.
Pakistan did not acquire a nuclear deterrent, defeat terrorism, develop the JF-17 ecosystem or deepen military cooperation with Türkiye by asking Washington for ideological approval. Yet Pakistani governments have repeatedly learned that openly humiliating the United States creates costs while flattering its president sometimes buys time. Pakistan must deal with the United States that exists, not the polite fictional superpower imagined in diplomatic textbooks.
However, Trump’s delight can also be understood through three American interests.
First, Washington wants wealthy partners to carry more of their own security burden while continuing to buy American weapon systems. A regional alliance does not threaten the American military-industrial model if its aircraft, missiles, sensors and support chains remain dependent on US suppliers.
Second, an arrangement involving two close American partners and one NATO member may help contain Iran without requiring unlimited American deployments. The United States can reduce direct exposure while retaining influence over the alliance’s logistics, interoperability and threat assessments.
Third, the pact may restrain Israel as a matter of deterrence while simultaneously preparing a broader US-sponsored regional security system in which Israel eventually becomes the unspoken technological node. That is where the Abraham Accords question becomes unavoidable.
Is the Pact Preparing Saudi Arabia and Pakistan for the Abraham Accords?
There is currently no public evidence that the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement contains a clause requiring Pakistan or Saudi Arabia to recognise Israel. There is also no disclosed evidence proving that it was secretly created as a bridge to the Abraham Accords. Presenting that suspicion as established fact would weaken rather than strengthen the Pakistani case.
But dismissing the possibility completely would be equally naïve.
The Abraham Accords are not merely ceremonial exchanges of embassies. Washington has consistently promoted them as a structure for diplomatic normalisation, commercial integration and regional security coordination involving Israel. A previous US policy explanation described Saudi-Israeli normalisation as the accords’ “ultimate realization.” That ambition did not disappear merely because Gaza exposed the moral bankruptcy of normalisation without Palestinian sovereignty.
Türkiye further complicates the picture. It recognised Israel decades ago and restored ambassador-level relations in 2022, although relations deteriorated sharply after Gaza. Ankara recalled its ambassador, suspended trade, restricted Israeli shipping and adopted an increasingly confrontational public position. Erdoğan has since described Israeli actions in Syria and Lebanon as a threat to Türkiye itself. It is therefore inaccurate to portray current Turkish-Israeli relations as warm, but it is equally inaccurate to pretend that a diplomatic and institutional history does not exist.
Saudi Arabia has been Washington’s most desired addition to the normalisation framework. Pakistan remains the most symbolically important Muslim state still refusing recognition of Israel without a just settlement for Palestine. Joining these two states with Türkiye creates a platform that could resist Israeli aggression—but, under different political management, the same platform could be sold as the Muslim security pillar of an American-designed regional order.
That possibility is not destiny. It is precisely why Islamabad must draw its red lines now.
The Pact Must Restrain Israel, Not Launder It
If the Makkah agreement responds only when Iranian missiles or Houthi drones strike Saudi territory, while remaining silent when Israel attacks Muslim land, occupies Palestinian territory or threatens Al-Aqsa Mosque, then the alliance will lose moral legitimacy before it develops military credibility.
Its founding test is painfully simple: does “collective security” include security from Israeli aggression, or does it merely mean protecting American-aligned governments from Washington’s chosen adversaries?
One social-media post included with the public debate accuses the three signatories of ignoring Gaza and forming an alliance only after Saudi Arabia faced Iranian and Houthi retaliation. Its claim that Israel has killed “millions” since October 2023 is not substantiated by the evidence presented and should not be repeated as a verified statistic. Its underlying political question, however, cannot be dismissed through fact-checking one exaggerated number: why did the Muslim world fail to build meaningful collective deterrence while Palestinians were being devastated?
The pact’s credibility will not be measured by ceremonial language about brotherhood. It will be measured by whether it produces coordinated diplomatic penalties, air and missile defence, maritime protection, intelligence sharing, humanitarian access and a firm prohibition against facilitating attacks on another Muslim country.
Pakistan should insist that no signatory’s territory, airspace, ports or intelligence infrastructure may be used for an offensive operation against another member of the Muslim world without collective consultation and a defensible basis under international law. Otherwise, Pakistan could be dragged into defending the consequences of decisions it neither approved nor controlled.
For the broader background, Pakistan’s experience during the Iran-Israel war shows why a binary choice between Tehran and Washington would be strategically disastrous. Likewise, Pakistan’s developing defence diplomacy with Kuwait demonstrates that Islamabad can expand Gulf security cooperation without surrendering every relationship to an anti-Iran template.
