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Nawaz, Imran and Shehbaz Governments All Used the Same Broken Machinery
The sugar permit system is not the property of a single party. That is precisely why party loyalists cannot reform it.
Under earlier PML-N governments, export quotas and direct freight subsidies were used to move surplus sugar. A USDA assessment of the 2017-18 policy reported a freight subsidy of up to $97 per tonne on a quota expanded to two million tonnes.
During the PTI period, Punjab granted export support while the 2018-20 sugar crisis produced rising prices and a major inquiry. The Competition Commission of Pakistan’s 2020 sugar enquiry examined stock declarations, ex-mill pricing and anti-competitive conduct. Imran Khan’s government deserves credit for ordering investigations, but investigation after a distorted market did not protect consumers before the damage.
Under the current Shehbaz Sharif government, approximately 750,000 to 796,000 tonnes were exported, domestic prices climbed, TCP imported 300,000 tonnes under broad tax relief, and 108,000 tonnes are now being offered abroad.
Different governments. Different speeches. The same machine.
Permit holders seek favourable timing. Politicians receive competing stock estimates. Bureaucrats approve quotas. Consumers discover the shortage after prices move. The state imports in panic. Then every party blames its predecessor or accuses its former colleagues of bad faith.
Pakistan does not need another sugar inquiry destined to become a PDF. It needs to remove the discretionary lever that every government eventually misuses.
Abolish the Permit System—but Do Not Hand the Market to a Cartel
The proposed solution is not an unregulated free-for-all. Pakistan’s sugar industry is concentrated, politically connected and repeatedly investigated for anti-competitive conduct. Removing government permits without enforcing competition could replace bureaucratic manipulation with private cartel manipulation.
The correct reform is rules-based liberalisation. Any qualified producer or trader should be allowed to import or export sugar under the same published conditions. Trade should respond automatically to verified national stocks, domestic-price bands and a legally defined strategic reserve. No minister should decide which mill receives a quota. No committee should be able to change the rules after a closed meeting. No TCP monopoly should emerge unless Parliament or the cabinet publicly declares a food-security emergency with a time limit and audit requirement.
The Ministry of Finance says the government has already created a task force to recommend full sugar-market liberalisation, and the IMF has incorporated deregulation as a structural benchmark. Yet the promised June 2026 transition has slipped while discretionary export demands and TCP tenders continue.
| Reform | Required action |
|---|---|
| End political export quotas | Allow any compliant exporter once transparent stock and price triggers are met |
| Liberalise imports | Permit qualified private importers under uniform duties and quality controls |
| Protect strategic reserves | Establish a legally defined reserve that cannot be counted as exportable stock |
| Verify stocks independently | Publish mill-wise production, dispatch, warehouse and carryover figures weekly |
| Protect growers | Digitally record cane deliveries and require payment within a fixed statutory period |
| Eliminate selective tax treatment | Publish the beneficiary, cost and duration of every waiver or SRO |
| Audit emergency procurement | Release TCP bids, benchmarks, landed costs, buyers and disposal proceeds |
| Prevent cartelisation | Empower CCP to act rapidly against coordinated withholding and territorial arrangements |
| Publish conflicts of interest | Require committee members and public officials to disclose sugar-industry interests |
Wheat should follow the same principle. Producers and traders can generally respond to supply gaps more efficiently than officials issuing late import and export permissions, but only if every participant receives equal market access and the government publishes credible stock data. Pakistan’s repeated wheat and sugar reversals show how discretionary intervention destroys the price signals farmers need before deciding what to sow.
The Debt Graphic Is Directionally Powerful—but Its Political Split Needs Correction
The circulating debt table claims approximately Rs19.5 trillion was added during Imran Khan’s government, around Rs39 trillion after his removal, and Rs58–59 trillion since 2018. The overall increase is close to the official record, but the political-period split appears to mix dates or debt definitions.
The Pakistan Economic Survey 2025-26 reports total public debt of Rs24.953 trillion in June 2018, Rs49.242 trillion in June 2022 and Rs83.285 trillion in March 2026.
